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We examine the determinants of the at issue time to maturity of corporate bonds.   
We find evidence that corporations partly determine the at issue maturity of bonds by 
responding to economic conditions. They also appear to immunise by matching the 
maturity of assets with the at issue maturity of bonds regardless of credit quality. 
Finally, we find evidence that the security level (our proxy for the recovery rate) is 
inversely related to the at issue time to maturity. This suggests that lenders use the 
promised maturity and security level bond covenants as screening mechanisms to 
overcome some of the asset substitution and adverse selection problems associated 
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The at issue maturity of corporate bonds: the influence of credit rating, security 
level, duration and macroeconomic conditions 
 
 
The most fundamental corporate bond covenant is the at issue maturity of the bond. 
While there are a number of theories proposed that could explain why a particular 
corporate bond should have a specific maturity, there is little investigation that 
attempt to validate these theories. This paper represents one of the few attempts to 
address this gap. 
 
Our work differs from previous research in that it focuses on the factors that 
determine the maturity of new bond issues. In contrast most empirical research (Stohs 
and Mauer, 1996, Barclay and Smith, 1995 are good examples) is concerned with the 
corporate finance issue of the maturity choice of the firm’s existing debt and its role in 
determining the optimal capital structure. This work is insightful as it explains the 
supply side of the factors that determine the maturity of corporate bond issues. From 
this research we know that agency problems, signalling, asymmetric information and 
tax effects all play a role in determining the average maturity of corporate debt for a 
particular firm. Another aspect is the demand side, specifically, what features do 
investors find desirable in determining the maturity of a corporate bond? We think 
this question is particularly relevant give that the now mature swap market enables the 
firm to transform the maturity characteristics of existing debt and so are now able to 
respond to the needs of investors. By approaching the maturity question from this 
fresh perspective we hope to gain new insights concerning the factors that determine 
the at issue maturity of corporate bonds.  
 
Because of our demand side focus, our approach differs from previous research in 
three other ways. First we control for classes of credit risk as we examine the factors 
that are supposed to explain the at issue maturity choice for corporate bonds. In 
contrast Guedes and Opler (1996), whose sample verifies theory in that the maturity 
choice is related to credit rating, do not control for credit rating in their later empirical 
investigations. We find substantial variation in maturity of bonds within credit ratings 
and so the factors that determine this choice has not been studied. Second we select 
only straight bonds thereby assuring our results pertain to bonds of known promised ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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maturity. In contrast, other studies by Guedes and Opler (1996), and Mitchel (1991) 
study the interactions between call and maturity features of new issues. While these 
studies made an important contribution to the literature, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet  
(1980) show that call features are equally capable of resolving agency problems and 
asymmetric information issues as the maturity choice, so a study that specifically 
focuses on the maturity choice only is appropriate. Finally the demand side focus 
leads us to consider the macro economic environment as summarised by the level and 
slope of the Treasury term structure and the credit spread and the influence this may 
have on the at issue maturity of corporate debt. To the best of our knowledge, the role 
these factors may play have not been empirically verified even though Stiglitz and 
Wiess (1981) suggests they should have an important influence on the maturity of 
new issues. 
 
We have four main findings.  First we confirm Diamond’s (1991) prediction that the 
at issue maturity of corporate debt is related to credit rating where high grade bonds 
tend to be short term and low grade bonds tend to be longer term. This finding is not 
new; Guedes and Opler (1996) find this result. However what is new is that we find 
wide variation in new issue maturity within broad rating categories so we wish to 
explain this variation. 
 
Second, by detecting a negative relation between the security level and the at issue 
time to maturity of a bond, we find that the security level may help explain the shape 
of the corporate yield curve.  Specifically, we find that senior (secured) bonds tend to 
have a shorter maturity than more junior (unsecured) bonds.  Since Fridson and 
Garman (1997) find that below investment grade senior (secured) bonds are less credit 
worthy than the corresponding junior (unsecured) bonds of the same credit rating, this 
would explain why Helwege and Turner (1999) find that below investment grade bond 
yield curves are too often downward sloping. Specifically Helwege and Turner (1999) 
suggest that long-term bonds of below investment grade are more credit worthy than 
short-term bonds of the same credit rating so that below investment grade bond yield 
curves are too often downward sloping. Since we find that short-term bonds tend to be 
lower credit quality secured bonds and longer term bonds tend to be higher credit 
quality unsecured bonds this may explain why below investment grade yield curves 
are too often downward sloping. We find that this relationship between ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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seniority/security and new issue maturity is not confined to below investment grade 
bonds only, but occurs throughout the entire range of credit ratings thereby 
confirming the theoretical predictions of Diamond (1993).   
 
Third, we also find evidence that macroeconomic conditions influence the at issue 
maturity of all bonds, regardless of credit quality.  In particular, firms tend to issue 
shorter-term bonds when short-term yields are high, when the yield curve is upward 
sloping, and when the credit spread is large. These results are consistent with Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) who predict that when interest rates are high, capital rationing is 
more severe. Then lenders may resort to additional screening mechanisms to 
overcome adverse selection and asset substitution problems that are more evident in 
high interest rate environments. One type of additional screening mechanism is to 
demand short-term debt to reduce credit risk that increase with maturity coupled with 
a security covenant to reduce the impact of a potential crisis at maturity problem. 
 
Fourth, holding the credit rating constant, our analysis finds a positive and statistically 
significant relation between the maturity of assets and the at issue time to maturity on 
a bond.  This confirms previous supply side research that firms do attempt to 
immunise their assets by financing longer-term assets with longer-term debt but it 
does so in much more detail. Specifically these results show that in part the variation 
of maturities within credit ratings can be explained by asset maturity. While 
immunisation occurs throughout the full range of credit ratings the results are 
strongest for investment grade bonds. These results confirm Sarkar (1999) who 
predicts that immunisation would be prevalent for investment grade rather than below 
investment grade bonds. 
 
In the next section, we discuss previous work. In section II we develop our hypothesis 
and proxies.  We then discuss our data in section III and conduct our analysis in 
section IV.  In section V we discuss and summarise our results and present our 
conclusions in section VI. 
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I. Theory and Evidence 
 
Diamond (1991) suggests that the appropriate at issue maturity of a given corporate 
bond is a result of the interplay between two aspects of credit risk. First all long-term 
bonds tend to be more credit risky that short-term bonds because of uncertainty 
concerning future credit conditions. Second, offsetting this is the “crisis at maturity” 
problem first suggested by Johnson (1967). Weaker credits typically cannot repay 
maturing debt as it comes due and instead rely upon repaying maturing debt from the 
proceeds of sale of new debt.  To the extent that there is future uncertainty as to 
whether weak credits can “roll over” retiring debt, the retiring bond runs the risk of 
default at maturity.  As “roll over” risk is apparent on all weak credit bonds, whatever 
the bond’s original maturity, weak credits would rather issue long-term bonds. 
However, issuing long term bonds is not an option for weak credits since there is 
more uncertainly concerning the bond’s ability to service cash flow under potential 
future adverse economic conditions. As a result of this interplay between increasing 
credit risk with maturity and roll over risk, non-investment grade bonds settle down in 
the middle of the maturity spectrum. 
  
For strong credits, roll over risk is not a serious problem because if push comes to 
shove, they can repay debt from the sale of corporate assets. Due to low roll over risk, 
investment grade bonds stay at the short end of the maturity spectrum. Guedes and 
Opler (1996) find that investment grade bonds tend to be short and long term but 
speculative grade bonds tend to be medium term thereby supporting Diamond (1991). 
 
Theoretical insights provided by agency and asymmetric information theory suggests 
reasons why firms than can issue short-term debt would do so in preference to issuing 
long term debt. Myers (1977) suggest that short-term debt reduces the under 
investment problem because debt re-contracted just prior to exercise of growth 
options helps ensures that new debt is priced correctly. Building on this insight, 
Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980) argue that issuing short term rather than long-term 
debt is a low cost alternative to resolving agency problems and information 
asymmetries that occur when debt is introduced into the capital structure of the firm. 
They also show that issuing callable debt is equally capable of resolving these agency 
problems. Guedes and Opler (1996) and Mitchell (1991) verifies Myers (1977) and ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980) finding that firms with above average growth 
prospects tend to issue short term bonds thereby attempting to resolve information 
asymmetries and agency conflicts associated with the under investment problem. 
 
Mitchell (1991) and Sarkar (1999) study the influence of asset structure on the 
maturity structure of debt. Mitchell (1991) suggests that the firm’s choice to issue 
short term or long-term bonds depends on whether the firm has short term or long-
term assets. The firm could immunise its assets thereby hedging interest rate risk by 
financing long term (interest sensitive) assets with long term debt, and financing short 
term (interest insensitive) assets with short term debt. Sarkar’s (1999) model suggests 
that maturity matching should be more evident in the case of investment grade bonds 
rather than below investment grade bonds. This happens because investment grade 
bonds are more sensitive to interest rates than below investment grade bonds so 
immunisation should account for greater fluctuation in new issue maturity within the 
investment grade bond category. 
 
Stoh and Mauer (1996) find that firms match the average maturity of assets and 
liabilities but do not attempt to see whether the maturity of new bonds is related to 
asset maturity.  Additionally Mitchell (1991) and Guedes and Opler (1996) find a 
positive but sometimes statistically insignificant relation between the maturity of 
assets and the at issue time to maturity of a bond.  However Mitchell (1991) and 
Guedes and Opler (1996) do not control for the effects of credit rating in any detail. 
We suspect that the mixed empirical evidence occurs because the optimal trade off 
between credit risk that increases with maturity and roll over risk varies with credit 
rating and may obscure the effects asset maturity may have on the at issue mature of 
debt. 
 
Stiglitz and Wiess (1981) argue that credit rationing exists in capital markets because 
the interest rate charged on loans perversely influences project selection and adversely 
screens loan applicants. Specifically, as interest rates rise, risky projects become 
relatively more attractive to potential borrowers who concern themselves with non-
bankruptcy state payoffs. Borrowers may be able to substitute less risky projects for 
more risky projects as interest rates rise to the detriment of lenders’ payoffs. 
Similarly, as interest rates rise, only the more risky borrowers are willing to promise ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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to pay the higher rate so banks may inadvertently select high-risk borrowers, again to 
the detriment of lenders’ payoffs. To protect themselves from these tendencies, 
lenders may impose stricter credit rationing rules as interest rates increase. For 
example lenders may demand shorter terms to reduce credit risk that increases with 
maturity and to demand seniority and/or security clauses to reduce exposure to roll 
over risk. These tendencies suggest that lending behaviour will be influenced by the 
level and slope of the Treasury term structure and the credit spread and affect the at 
issue maturity of debt. To the best of our knowledge, the role macroeconomic 
variables play in determining the maturity of new bonds has yet to be examined. 
 
Another strand of the literature examines the influence of seniority and security on the 
at issue maturity of bonds. Diamond (1993) develops a model that suggests that short-
term bonds should be senior and long-term bonds should be junior in order to 
maximise debt capacity. Additionally Fridson and Garman (1997) note that a junior 
bond is of higher credit quality than a senior bond even though both have the same 
credit rating. Their reasoning is as follows.  Consider two firms.  Let firm A be a safe 
firm and firm B be a risky firm.  Both firms issue two types of bonds, a junior bond 
and a senior bond.  Safe firm A’s junior bond is rated A and its’ senior bond is rated 
A+. Risky firm B’s junior bond is rated BBB+ and its’ senior bond is rated A.  Notice 
that both firms have now issued A rated bonds, firm A’s is junior and firm B’s is 
senior, but both A rated bonds may not be equally credit worthy. The safe firm’s 
junior A rated bond has a lower probability of default as compared to the risky firm’s 
senior A bond. However as Altman and Eberhart (1994) show, the safe firm’s junior 
A rated bond has a lower recovery in the event of default as compared to the risky 
firm’s senior A rated bond because a senior security level proxies for a greater 
recovery rate in the event of default. Whether both A rated bonds are equally risky 
depends on whether the expected loss rate, the product of the probability of default 
and the recovery rate given default, is equal. Fridson and Garman (1997) show that 
evidently the expected loss rate on the junior bond is less than the expected loss rate 
on the senior bond when both bonds have the same credit rating. Since the argument 
presented by Fridson and Garman (1997) apply to all bonds regardless of credit rating, 
this suggests that senior bonds are riskier than junior bonds of like ratings. 
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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Now consider Helwege and Turner (1999). They argue that we tend to find downward 
sloping below investment grade yield curves because of a selection bias. They show 
that for below investment grade bonds, say within the BB rating category, only the 
safer BB rated bonds go long term while the riskier BB rated bonds go short term. 
Therefore, longer-term bonds are the more credit worthy than shorter-term bonds of 
the same credit rating so below investment grade yield curves become downward 
sloping.  
 
It is possible that the Helwege and Turners’ (1999) findings are a result of credit 
rationing (Stiglitz and Wiess, 1981). That is bond investor’s realise that below 
investment grade ratings are only a crude measure of credit risk and apply finer 
screening rules. Since credit risk is positive related to maturity (Diamond 1991) 
weaker credits are offered only short maturities. Of course this means greater rollover 
risk, so creditors demand greater security in the event of default. This would imply 
that there is a relation between Fridson and Garman (1997) and Helwege and Turner’s 
(1999) findings. Specifically, we suspect that the reason why Helwege and Turner 
(1999) find that long-term BB bonds are safer than short-term BB bonds is that long-
term bonds tend to be safer junior bonds, and short-term bonds are less safe senior 
bonds.  If this were the case then we would expect this tendency to be evident for all 
investment grades, not just below investment grade bonds.   
 
II Hypothesis and Proxies 
  
We understand from Mitchell (1991), Guedes and Opler (1996) and Sarkar (1999) that 
there are strong theoretical reasons why long-term bonds should be used to finance 
long-term assets.  To date empirical evidence has been mixed. We believe that this is 
the case because the influence of asset maturity on new issue maturity of bonds can 
only be clearly found within broad rating categories.  This happens because the 
optimal trade off between credit risk that increases with maturity and the roll over risk 
differs for bonds of different credit ratings resulting in different preferred maturity 
ranges for different grades of bonds. It is possible that these effects wash out the 
influence asset maturity may have on the at issue maturity of bonds.     
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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Hypothesis 1 (The Immunization Hypothesis): Within a credit rating category, 
duration of an asset is positively related to at issue time to maturity, that is, as 
duration of assets increases, maturity increases. 
 
Our proxy for duration of the asset is the life of the asset.  We denote it by Industry 
Category, IC.  As the asset life rises, the interest rate sensitivity of the asset rises.  To 
match interest rate sensitivities, firms issue long term (high duration) bonds to match 
long term (high duration) assets and vice versa. Therefore, we expect to see a positive 
relation between asset life and at issue time to maturity. 
 
Fridson and Garman (1997) and Altman and Eberhart (1994) tell us that junior bonds 
are less risky than senior bonds of like ratings.  This happens because the product of a 
higher recovery rate, but a higher probability of default for senior (secured) bonds 
results in a higher expected loss rate than for junior (subordinated) bonds, which have 
a lower recovery rate but lower probability of default as well.  Helwege and Turner 
(1999) show that within the below investment grade bond category, longer-term 
bonds are more credit worthy than short-term bonds.  We suspect the latter is due to a 
selection bias caused by firms that attempt to maximise debt capacity (Diamond, 
1993) and by credit rationing (Stiglitz and Wiess, 1981) where long-term bonds tend 
to be more credit worthy junior bonds and shorter-term bonds less credit worthy 
senior bonds. However according to Diamond (1993) this should be a general 
tendency so we expect that short term bonds tend to be senior and long term bonds 
tend to be junior throughout the entire range of credit ratings. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (The loss rate hypothesis): Longer-term bonds are junior (subordinated) 
and shorter-term bonds are senior (secured). 
 
Our proxy for the recovery rate of the bond is security level of the bond SL. As 
security status improves the new issue maturity of bonds should decrease. However, 
as explained later, the proxy SL is constructed where lower values represent higher 
security, so we expect to see a positive coefficient for SL in later regressions. 
 
According to adverse selection and asset substitute problems of Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), credit rationing may become more sever as interest rates rise. A possible ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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response to credit rationing is to shorten the maturity of borrowings, as this will 
reduce the credit risk of the lender.
1 This suggests that as the level of the term 
structure increases and as the credit spread widens, the maturity of new corporate debt 
should decrease. Additionally, Fama (1984), Fama and Bliss (1987), Miskin (1988) 
and Hardouvelis (1988) all find evidence that forward rates can predict future spot 
interest rates. This implies that as the slope of the Treasury term structure increases, 
future rates of interest are likely to rise. Lenders may then impose credit rationing in 
anticipation of future interest rate increases thereby inducing lenders to borrow short 
term. Therefore as the slope of the term structure increases, the maturity of new 
corporate debt decreases. 
 
However, there are investors who wish to buy long term bonds say to match life 
insurance and pension plan liabilities regardless of economic conditions. If increases 
in interest rates are caused by a widening of the credit spread rather than a general rise 
in Treasury interest rates, then investment grade issues may be in an advantageous 
position to satisfy this demand. In this case investment grade bonds are less subject to 
the capital rationing effect and maybe able to sell long term at no extra cost. 
Therefore, we may see a positive relation between credit spread and at issue time to 
maturity for investment grade bonds.   
 
Hypothesis 3 (macroeconomic hypothesis): Macroeconomic conditions have an 
influence on the at issue maturity of bonds of all rating categories; specifically firms 
attempt to avoid credit rationing by borrowing short term as the level and slope of the 
Treasury yield curve increases and as the credit spread widens. 
 
Our proxies for macroeconomic factors are the short-term interest rate TB, the slope 
of term structure of interest rates SLOP, and the credit spread S.  We measure TB as 
the yield to maturity on a three month treasury bill, SLOP as the difference between 
yield to maturity on a ten year treasury note and three month treasury bill and S as the 
difference between the yield to maturity on Moodies Baa and Aaa yield indices. 
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III Data selection 
 
We use the LJS global information services’ Fixed Investment Securities Database 
(FISD).  This database consists of detailed cross sectional information on issue and 
issuer characteristics of all bonds that the National Association of Insurance 
Companies had on their books as of January 1, 1995, and all bonds that they bought 
up to and including January 15, 2002.
  Each of the 111,140 bond issues is identified 
by cusip number and includes information on maturity date, offering date, rating date, 
offering amount, industry code, rating, rating type, call and put features. 
 
From FISD, we select bonds with an offering date January 1, 1995 to December 31, 
2001 that belong to the industrial, financial and utility industries while we eliminate 
Treasury bonds and other miscellaneous bonds.  This leaves us with manufacturing, 
media and communications, oil and gas, railroad, retail, and service and leisure bonds 
from the industrial industry; banking, credit finance, financial services, insurance, real 
estate, savings and loan and leasing bonds from the financial industry and finally 
electric, gas, telephone and water bonds from the utility industry. As can be seen from 
Table I, each of these bonds is assigned ‘0’ or ‘1’ depending on whether the industry 
type that issues them have short lived or long lived assets respectively.  In this way 
industry category IC is treated as a binary variable. 
 
We further cull our sample by eliminating all bonds with call and put features because 
call and put provisions introduce uncertainty concerning the maturity of a given 
bond.
2  On examining these straight corporate bonds for rating type we find that Fitch 
concentrates on financial industry bonds.  Since this could bias our results we 
eliminate bonds rated by Fitch only.  Duff and Phelp do not rate many bonds within 
each rating category, so we decide to drop bonds rated by Duff and Phelp only as 
well.  However, we consider all Standard and Poors and Moodys rated bonds as they 
rate a large number of bonds in all industry categories that we select.  Of these we 
only keep those that have a rating date within one year of the offering date so as to 
make sure that the bond under study has the same rating it had on the date it was 
offered. Finally, we find only very few CC and C rated bonds so we eliminate these 
grades from consideration. This gives us a sample of 11,211 straight Standard and ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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Poors and Moodys rated bonds with its’ rating dated within one year of the offering 
date.   
   
For the non-callable Standard and Poors and Moodys rated bonds we assign numbers 
to ratings, as seen in Table II.  Most bond issues have the same ratings from Standard 
and Poors and Moodys but in some cases they differ. Jewel and Livingston (1998) 
find that the yields of all bonds, including below investment grade, reflect the average 
of Moodys and Standard and Poors ratings rather than the higher or the lower of the 
two. Therefore in cases where Standard and Poors and Moodys disagree, we assign 
the bond to the broad rating category that corresponds to the average of the two rating 
numbers.  For example for averages from 1 to 1.5 we assign rating AAA, for averages 
from 2 to 4.5 we assign rating AA and so on, as can be seen from Table II.  In this 
way we arrange bonds by broad rating categories.  
 
As seen from Table III, we go on to assign numerical values to the security level SL, 1 
for the highest security bond and 7 for the lowest security bond.  In other words, the 
lower the assigned numerical value the higher the security level and potential 
recovery value in the event of default.  
 
We collect the three month and ten year daily constant maturity Treasury yields and 
the daily Moodys Baa and AAA yields from the Federal Reserve. We match the cross 
sectional bond data as selected above to the corresponding time series of the yield to 
maturity on the three month treasury bill TB, difference between the yield to maturity 
on the ten year treasury note and the yield to maturity on the three month treasury bill 
SLOP, and the difference between the Baa Moodys yield and the AAA Moodys yield 
S, as of the offering date
3.  These variables represent our proxies for macroeconomic 
variables, specifically the level TB, and slope of the term structure SLOP and the 
credit spread, S.      
 
Now we arrange bonds into broad maturity categories (difference between maturity 
date and offering date, measured in days) of 0 – 1 year, 2 – 5 years, 6 – 10 years, 11 – 
30 years and > 30 years time to maturity, as seen from Table IV. A greater percentage 
of issues are concentrated in the 0 – 1 year category for AAA, AA and A rated bonds.  
This concentration shifts out to 2 – 5 years for BBB’s and BB’s and 6 – 10 years for ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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B’s.  Since there are only 26 issues in the CCC credit rating category, we cannot pin 
point the maturity category where these issues are concentrated.   
 
These findings are in accordance with Diamond (1991) who as previously discussed, 
suggests that the trade off between the credit risk that increases with maturity and roll 
over risk will result in a longer average maturity as credit quality deteriorates and are 
consistent with the empirical findings of Guedes and Opler (1996). Specifically we 
find that the average at issue maturity increases from around three years for AAA, AA 
and A to around five years for BBB and BB and then to almost eight years for bonds 
rated B. We also find substantial variation in the at issue maturity of bonds within 
each broad rating category. For most grades of bonds the average standard deviation 
in maturity is around four years. BBB rated bonds have the greatest variation in 
maturity at almost six years and CCC have the least variation in maturity at three 
years. This supports our view that there is a great deal of variation in maturity within 




We check the data for multicollinearity. Table V shows that the sample correlation 
coefficient between all the explanatory variables stays below 0.52, with one exception 
of -0.79 in case of the correlation between the Treasury bill yield and the slope of the 
term structure. We would expect a correlation between the Treasury bill yield and the 
slope of the Treasury yield curve because we measure the slope as the difference 
between the ten-year Treasury note and the three-month Treasury bill yield.  
However, other measures of the slope, such as the difference between the ten-year 
Treasury and the six-month Treasury bill yield and the ten-year Treasury and the one-
year Treasury bill yield show an even higher correlation coefficient.  Also, the 
correlation between our proxies for the level and slope of the treasury term structure 
could be magnified because of the pooled cross sectional time series nature of the data 
where the same treasury bill rate and slope are repeated for different bond issues as of 
the same offering date.  In latter regressions we find no evidence of high collinearity 
as in most cases the regressions were able to find statistically significant TB and 
SLOP coefficients.  We conclude that we do not have a problem with 
multicollinearity. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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Next we use the Durbin – Watson test statistic to detect the presence of first order 
autocorrelation.  We find that for A, BBB and BB rated bonds the regression errors 
display first order positive correlation.
4 We go on and apply the Box Jenkin 
methodology to look for higher order autocorrelation and examine correlograms and 
partial correlograms to check for the order of autocorrelation.  We found little 
evidence of higher order correlation so we corrected for first order autocorrelation for 
these three regressions. We correct the pooled cross sectional time series data 
(adjusted for first order autocorrelation when appropriate) for heteroscedasticity using 
White (1980).  In summary we estimate an autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
consistent estimate of regression (1)  
 
) 1 ...( 5 4 3 2 1 0 it it it it it it it S SLOP TB SL IC TTM e b b b b b b + + + + + + =    
     
where,    
 
it TTM  : At issue time to maturity of bond ‘i’ at offering date ‘t’.  
 
it IC  : Industry category for bond ‘i’ at offering date ‘t’. 
    
it SL  : Security level for bond ‘i’ at offering date ‘t’. 
 
it TB  : Yield to maturity on three month treasury bill corresponding to bond ‘i’ as of 
offering date ‘t’. 
 
it SLOP  : Slope of term structure of interest rates corresponding to bond ‘i’ as of 
offering date ‘t’. 
 
it S  : Credit spread corresponding to bond ‘i’ as of offering date ‘t’. 
 
The dependent variable TTM is the difference between the scheduled maturity date 
and the offering date measured in days. We estimate a regression of the at issue time ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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to maturity on industry code IC, security level SL, treasury bill TB, slope SLOP, and 
credit spread S for all the bonds in our sample in one go, as well as bonds within each 
of the seven broad rating categories, that is, AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, eight 
different regression equations in all.
5  
 
V Results and discussion 
 
All the regressions are significant according to the regression F – statistic and have an 
adjusted R
2 between 8 % and 21 %. CCC rated bonds are an exception where we have 
an adjusted R
2 of 31 %. This is rather high as compared to the other adjusted R
2’s.  
We attribute it to having only 26 observations on CCC rated bonds. 
 
As seen from Table VI, the regression results appear to validate all three hypotheses 
to some degree.  When we regress all bonds together, regardless of credit ratings, we 
find that as expected the industry category IC and security level SL coefficients are 
significantly positive at the 1% level and the Treasury bill TB and slope Slop 
coefficients are significantly negative at the 1% level. This supports the immunisation 
(IC), loss rate (SL) and macroeconomic (TB, Slop) hypothesis. Only the credit spread 
(Spread) coefficient is not significant which is about what we should expect given that 
we suspect that for high quality investment grade bonds this coefficient maybe 
positive, but for below investment grade bonds this coefficient should be negative. 
Clearly the overall regression reports the results on an aggregate level and we would 
like to explain in more detail variation in the at issue maturity of different grades of 
bonds. 
 
First we look at the immunization hypothesis.  Looking at the A rating category, we 
note that as the IC moves from 0 to 1, that is to say as we move from short lived assets 
to long lived assets, the at issue time to maturity of these bonds increases by 795.93 
days or by 2 years and 2 months.  This result is significant at the 1 % level.  Similarly 
we observe statistically significant (at 1 % level) positive IC coefficients for all other 
investment grades.  In contrast we observe that for below investment grade bonds 
only the CCC IC coefficient is significantly positive while the remaining BB and B IC 
coefficients are not statistically significant. Overall, these findings are in accordance 
with Sarkar (1999) who suggests that maturity matching should be more evident in the ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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case of investment grade bonds because they are more interest rate sensitive than 
below investment grade bonds. We conclude that we have found some support for the 
immunization hypothesis, although the evidence for below investment grade bonds is 
not as strong as was in the case of investment grade bonds.   
 
Second we note that as the security level SL which is a proxy for the recovery rate of 
the bond, moves from 1 to 7, that is to say as we move from larger expected 
recoveries to smaller expected recoveries, the at issue time to maturity of A rated 
bonds increase by 997.19 days or by 2 years and seven months.  This result is 
significant at the 1 % level. Similarly we observe statistically significant (at the 1 % 
level) positive SL coefficients for all other bonds, except for CCC rated bonds. 
Evidently bonds with more security tend to be short term. This suggests that the 
security level covenant is used to maximise debt capacity, which supports Diamond 
(1993). Furthermore the fact that for below investment grade bonds, senior bonds tend 
to be short term provides an explanation why Helwege and Turner (1999) find that 
below investment grade bond yield curves tend to be downward sloping more often 
than they should. Specifically Fridson and Garman (1997) and Altman and Eberhart 
(1994) tell us that senior bonds are more risky than junior bonds of like ratings. This 
suggests that we tend to find downward sloping below investment grade yield curves 
too often because of a selection bias. Selection bias occurs because short term senior 
bonds of risky companies have a greater expected lose rate than long term junior 
bonds of more safe companies, even though both have the same credit rating. But 
when Helwege and Turner correct for selection bias by selecting matched pairs of 
bonds from the same firm with the same seniority in the liability structure, below 
investment grade bond yield curves become upward sloping. 
 
Finally, we observe strong support for the macroeconomic hypothesis.  In most 
instances the TB, SLOP and S coefficients are of the expected signs and are 
statistically significant. Looking first at the Treasury variables and ignoring the CCC 
grade, we observe that with only two exceptions, the level and the slope coefficients 
are of the expected negative sign and are significant for all grades of bonds. The two 
exceptions are the AAA level and the BBB slope coefficients. The exceptional poor 
result for CCC may be a function of a small sample size. Looking at the credit spread 
coefficient, only three of the coefficients are significant, but an interesting pattern ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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emerges. For high grade bonds, specifically AAA and A, the spread coefficient is 
significantly positive indicating that for these grades of bonds issuers can respond to a 
widening of credit spreads by offering longer term bonds to investors needing to 
invest long term regardless of current economic conditions. In contrast below 
investment grade bonds, specifically BB, are subject to credit rationing and so when 
credit spreads widen, they must respond to credit rationing by offering shorter-term 
bonds. 
 
To check for robustness, we also split our sample into two equal length time periods: 
January 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 and July 1, 1998 to December 31, 2001.  The latter 
period has the 1998 Russian default and the East Asian currency crisis and the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack.  We follow the same econometric steps in regard 
to possible multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity as in the full 
sample.   
 
Comparing Tables VII and VIII it is evident that the results for the early period are 
less significant than the corresponding results from the later period.  For example 
looking at the aggregate regression for all bonds we note that in the first period only 
the industry code IC, security level SL and Treasury bill TB coefficients are 
significant but in the second sub-period all five coefficients are significant. A possible 
explanation for this is contained in Table IX, which shows that for the first sub-
period, the variation in the term structure variables is much smaller. Meanwhile the 
second period’s sample characteristics are similar to the full period’s sample 
characteristics. With a smaller sample variation in the macroeconomic variables it 
would be more challenging for the regression model to obtain statistically significant 
results. This is particularly the case here since the sample size as reported in tables 
VII and VIII is much smaller is the first sub period (3,160 observations) than in the 
second sub period (8,046 observations).
6 
 
Nevertheless, we find strong support for all three hypotheses in each of the sub 
periods with two important exceptions.  First, for some reason, under AA’s for the 
first period as TB increases by 1% the at issue time to maturity increases rather than 
decreases by 937.68 days or by 2 years and six months. The result is significant at the 
1 % level.  Secondly, under BB’s for the second time period as IC increases from 0 to ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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1, that is as we move from short lived assets to long lived assets, the at issue time to 
maturity decreases rather than increases by 496.71 days or by 1 year and 4 months.  
The result is significant at the 5 % level.  Otherwise when the coefficients are 
significant they are of the expected sign.    
 
VI Summary and Conclusions 
 
Our empirical tests show that like Guedes and Opler (1996) higher credit quality 
bonds concentrate their at issue maturity at the shorter end of the maturity spectrum. 
In contrast lower credit quality bonds concentrate their at issue maturity at longer 
terms.  However, there is variation in at issue maturity within credit rating categories 
and unlike Guedes and Opler (1996), we seek to explain this variation. 
 
Unlike prior research, we show that junior bonds tend to have longer at issue time to 
maturity than senior bonds.  This is in accordance with Diamond (1993) who suggests 
that firms should sell short-term senior and long-term junior bonds in order to 
maximise debt capacity. This also suggests that Helwege and Turner’s (1999) 
discovery, that below investment grade yield curves tend to be downward sloping is 
related to the security level of the bonds. This finding corroborates Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) who suggests that creditors may use additional screening mechanisms to 
reduce the impact of credit rationing. In this case, it looks as though weaker credits 
can over come credit rationing by selling shorter-term debt with a seniority clause. 
Furthermore the tendency that long term bonds are more credit worthy than shorter-
term bonds of like credit ratings may not be restricted to below investment grade 
bonds.  We find that more credit worthy junior bonds tend to be of longer maturity 
throughout the entire range of credit ratings. 
Like Guedes and Opler (1996) and Mitchell (1991) we find evidence that the term of 
debt is matched to the term of assets but unlike these prior studies we find that 
maturity matching occurs throughout the credit rating system. We find that this 
tendency is particularly strong for the investment grade categories thereby supporting 
Sarkar (1999).  
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Finally unlike prior work, we find that macroeconomic conditions have an influence 
on the at issue maturity of all bonds. These finding are supportive of Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) in that faced with the possibility of credit rationing, bonds of all ratings 
agree to shorter maturities thereby reducing credit risk and avoiding the asset 
substitution and adverse selection problems associated with high interest rate 
environments. For example, as the three-month T-Bill rate increases, AAA and B 
bonds have “shorter” at issue maturity.  But short for AAA would be 0-1 year and 
short for B would be less than 6-10 years.  So, what is “short” depends on the usual at 
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Table I 
 
This table reports the Industry code IC binary variable used to proxy the maturity of assets in 
(1). A value of 1 is used to indicate that the assets of the firm that sold the bond are long term 
and a value of 0 indicates that the assets of the firm that sold the bond are short term. 
Industry  Long term  Short term 
Manufacturing  1   
Oil and Gas  1   
Railroad  1   
Insurance  1   
Real Estate  1   
Electric  1   
Gas  1   
Telephone  1   
Water  1   
Transportation  1   
Leasing  1   
Media and Communications    0 
Retail    0 
Services/Leisure    0 
Banking    0 
Credit Finance    0 
Financial Services    0 
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Table II 
 
This table reports how we grouped bonds into broad rating categories. The rule we used was 
first to assign numerical values to the ratings of Standard and Poors and Moodys as show in 
column three, then calculate an equally weighted average of Standard and Poors and Moodys 
ratings, then classify the bond into the broad rating category that corresponds to the average 
rounded up to the next whole number.  
S&P    Moodys    #    Avg. 
AAA    Aaa    1    1-1.5 
AA+    Aa1    2     
AA    Aa/Aa2    3    2-4.5 
AA-    Aa3    4     
A+    A1    5     
A    A/A2    6    5-7.5 
A-    A3    7     
BBB+    Baa1    8     
BBB    Baa/Baa2    9    8-10.5 
BBB-    Baa3    10     
BB+    Ba1    11     
BB    Ba/Ba2    12    11-13.5 
BB-    Ba3    13     
B+    B1    14     
B    B2    15    14-16.5 
B-    B3    16     
CCC+    Caa1    17     
CCC    Caa2    18    17-19.5 
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Table III 
 
This table reports the numerical values corresponding to the security level SL that we use as a 
proxy for the expected recovery rate in (1) where the higher the value, the larger the expected 
recovery value.  
Security Level    # 
     
Senior Secured    1 
     
Senior    2 
     
Senior Subordinate    3 
     
None    4 
     
Subordinate    5 
     
Junior    6 
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Table IV 
 
This table shows the variation in maturity of our sample of 11,211 bonds by credit rating. In 







































(SD) in Years 
AAA               
No. of issues   731  430  90  37  8  1,296  3.02 
Issues (%)  56.40  33.18  6.94  2.85  0.62  11.57  (4.34) 
AA               
No. of issues   1,687  885  166  45  14  2,797  2.80 
Issues (%)  60.31  31.64  5.93  1.61  0.50  24.97  (4.10) 
A               
 No. of issues   2,706  1,902  381  113  10  5,112  2.90 
Issues (%)  52.93  37.21  7.45  2.21  0.20  45.63  (3.93) 
BBB               
 No. of issues   286  682  240  69  3  1,289  5.11 
Issues (%)  22.34  53.28  18.75  5.39  0.23  11.43  (5.62) 
BB               
 No. of issues   18  224  95  8  0  345  4.93 
Issues (%)  5.22  64.93  27.54  2.32  0.00  3.08  (3.72) 
B               
 No. of issues   20  69  245  12  0  346  7.75 
Issues (%)  5.78  19.94  70.81  3.47  0.00  3.09  (3.52) 
CCC               
No. of issues   6  9  11  0  0  26  4.86 
Issues (%)  23.08  34.62  42.31  0.00  0.00  0.23  (3.03) 
Total No. issues  5,454  4,201  1,228  284  35  11,211  3.36 
Total Issues (%)  48.69  37.50  10.96  2.54  0.31  100  (4.37) ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-01 
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Table V 
 
This table reports the correlation matrix for explanatory variables for the entire sample period 
from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2001. 
   IC  R  SL  TB  SLOP  S 
IC  1.00  0.31  0.20  -0.04  0.02  0.04 
R  0.31  1.00  0.14  -0.07  0.08  -0.01 
SL  0.20  0.14  1.00  -0.04  0.02  0.03 
TB  -0.04  -0.07  -0.04  1.00  -0.79  -0.52 
SLOP  0.02  0.08  0.02  -0.79  1.00  0.21 
S  0.04  -0.01  0.03  -0.52  0.21  1.00 
 
    IC: industry category 
    R: rating category 
    SL: security level 
    TB: yield to maturity on three-month Treasury bill 
    SLOP: slope of term structure of interest rates 
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Table VI 
 
This table reports the multivariate regression results for the entire sample period from January 
1, 1995 until December 31, 2001. The sample size is 11,211. For each regression, sample size 
and corrected R













































  Parameter  
(in days) 
Parameter 
 (in years) 
T-Statistic 
       
All Bonds (N=11,211) R
2=0.158       
Industry Code (IC)  1201.57
***  3.29  16.25 
Security Level (SL)      975.73
***  2.67  9.98 
Treasury Bill (TB)     -225.62
***  -0.62  -8.27 
Slope (SLOP)    -188.93
***  -0.52  -5.69 
Spread (S)  162.57
  0.45  0.95 
AAA (N=1,296) R
2=0.183       
Industry Code (IC)  2132.32***  5.8  7.13 
Security Level (SL)  805.05***  2.2  2.87 
Treasury Bill (TB)     7.40  0.0  0.89 
Slope (SLOP)  -187.79***  -0.5  -2.90 
Spread (S)  1004.24**  2.8  2.50 
AA (N=2,797) R
2=0.216       
Industry Code (IC)  2274.45***  6.2  7.75 
Security Level (SL)  1672.25***  4.6  5.43 
Treasury Bill (TB)  -166.88***  -0.5  -3.23 
Slope (SLOP)  -189.51***  -0.5  -2.91 
Spread (S)      -77.72  -0.2  -0.29 
A (N = 5,112) R
2=0.147       
Industry Code (IC)  795.93***  2.2  6.33 
Security Level (SL)  997.19***  2.7  7.06 
Treasury Bill (TB)  -163.26***  -0.4  -4.82 
Slope (SLOP)  -103.93***  -0.3  -2.73 
Spread (S)    450.87**  1.2  2.10 
BBB (N = 1,289) R
2=0.096       
Industry Code (IC)  1211.00***  3.3  6.88 
Security Level (SL)  779.46***  2.1  2.68 
Treasury Bill (TB)   -216.19**  -0.6  -1.96 
Slope (SLOP)     -170.57  -0.5  -1.19 
Spread (S)      -41.71  -0.1  -0.05 
BB (N = 345) R
2=0.102       
Industry Code (IC)    -259.09  -0.7  -1.29 
Security Level (SL)  662.48***  1.8  3.63 
Treasury Bill (TB)  -578.52***  -1.6  -4.78 
Slope (SLOP)  -527.49***  -1.4  -4.16 
Spread (S)  -2434.57***  -6.7  -2.93 
B (N = 346) R
2=0.082       
Industry Code (IC)     154.74  0.4  1.12 
Security Level (SL)  398.88***  1.1  2.74 
Treasury Bill (TB)  -357.66**  -1.0  -2.11 
Slope (SLOP)  -375.94**  -1.0  -2.35 
Spread (S)     263.74  0.7  0.39 
CCC (N = 26) R
2=0.315       
Industry Code (IC)  799.04***  2.2  2.62 
Security Level (SL)  163.23  0.4  0.41 
Treasury Bill TB)   -232.81  -0.6  -0.47 
Slope (SLOP)   99.34  0.3  0.87 
Spread (S)   -5021.82            -13.8  -1.60 
 
***Significance at the 1% level, **Significance at the 5% level 
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Table VII 
 
This table reports the multivariate regression results for the first half of the sample period 
from January 1, 1995 until June 30, 1998. As there were only five CCC observations, we were 
unable to estimate the results for the CCC grade. The sample size is 3,160. For each 
regression, sample size and corrected R














































  Parameter  
(in days) 
Parameter 
 (in years) 
T-Statistic 
       
All Bonds (N = 3,160) R
2 = 0.138       
Industry Code (IC)  941.95
***  2.58  6.78 
Security Level (SL)  1118.42
***  3.06  7.04 
Treasury Bill (TB)    -170.84
*  -0.47  -1.87 
Slope (SLOP)       6.25  0.02  0.10 
Spread (S)  -449.38  -1.23  -0.68 
AAA (N = 363) R
2 = 0.392       
Industry Code (IC)  1554.75***  4.26  3.20 
Security Level (SL)  685.07**  1.88  2.23 
Treasury Bill (TB)    60.41  0.17  0.51 
Slope (SLOP)  100.75  0.28  1.45 
Spread (S)     -304.45  -0.83  -0.35 
AA (N = 429) R
2 = 0.232       
Industry Code (IC)     234.63  0.64  0.17 
Security Level (SL)  2127.73***  5.83  3.18 
Treasury Bill (TB)  937.68***  2.57  2.71 
Slope (SLOP)      -55.88  -0.15  -0.29 
Spread (S)  4272.17**  11.70  2.26 
A (N = 1,828) R
2 = 0.152       
Industry Code (IC)   420.69*  1.15  1.79 
Security Level (SL)  1292.21***  3.54  5.07 
Treasury Bill (TB)     155.49  0.43  1.37 
Slope (SLOP)      -56.70  -0.16  -0.76 
Spread (S)    -315.10  -0.86  -0.42 
BBB (N = 355) R
2 = 0.133       
Industry Code (IC)  1658.88***  4.54  3.41 
Security Level (SL)   1143.57*  3.13  1.79 
Treasury Bill (TB)  -1297.64***  -3.56  -2.55 
Slope (SLOP)  63.32  0.17  0.88 
Spread (S)  -1981.28  -5.43  -0.41 
BB (N = 138) R
2 = 0.238       
Industry Code IC)     805.09  2.21  1.54 
Security Level (SL)  788.92**  2.16  2.10 
Treasury Bill (TB)  -2932.69***  -8.03  -3.46 
Slope (SLOP)     149.73  0.41  0.48 
Spread (S)  -8602.91  -23.57  -1.61 
B (N = 47) R
2 = 0.121       
Industry Code (IC)  1360.79**  3.73  1.98 
Security Level (SL)   240.62  0.66  0.67 
Treasury Bill (TB)   -1476.02  -4.04  -1.31 
Slope (SLOP)     -575.68  -1.58  -0.95 
Spread (S)    8549.39*  23.42  1.84 
 
***Significance at the 1% level, **Significance at the 5% level, *Significance at the 10% level 
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Table VIII 
 
This table reports the multivariate regression results for the second half of sample period from 
July 1, 1998 to December 31, 2001. The sample size is 8,046. For each regression, sample 
size and corrected R














































  Parameter (in days)  Parameter (in years)  T-Statistic 
       
All Bonds (N= 8,046) R
2=0.158       
Industry Code (IC)  1298.99
***  3.56  17.03 
Security Level (SL)  927.18
***  2.54  9.48 
Treasury Bill (TB)  -232.03
***  0.64  -6.93 
Slope (SLOP)  -186.38
***  0.51  -4.30 
Spread (S)             -354.59
*  0.97  -1.87 
AAA (N= 933) R
2=0.163       
Industry Code (IC)  2179.23***  5.97  6.77 
Security Level (SL)  1157.30***  3.17  3.12 
Treasury Bill (TB)             -37.52  -0.10  -0.33 
Slope (SLOP)          -231.75  -0.63  -1.55 
Spread (S)           260.28  0.71  0.53 
AA (N = 2,368) R
2=0.226       
Industry Code (IC)  2412.74***  6.61  7.95 
Security Level (SL)  1555.79***  4.26  4.89 
Treasury Bill (TB)  -275.90***  -0.76  -4.85 
Slope (SLOP)  -331.63***  -0.91  -4.52 
Spread (S)           -370.28  -1.01  -1.12 
A (N = 3,284) R
2=0.141       
Industry Code (IC)  999.62***  2.74  7.50 
Security Level (SL)  862.63***  2.36  6.30 
Treasury Bill (TB)             -81.31
*  -0.22  -1.75 
Slope (SLOP)            31.94  0.09  0.54 
Spread (S)          -301.49  -0.83  -1.17 
BBB (N = 934) R
2=0.079       
Industry Code (IC)  1000.38***  2.74  5.66 
Security Level (SL)             705.14**  1.93  2.35 
Treasury Bill (TB)            50.18  0.14  0.29 
Slope (SLOP)           134.39  0.37  0.53 
Spread (S)            -49.97  -0.14  -0.05 
BB (N = 207) R
2=0.104       
Industry Code (IC)            -496.71**  -1.36  -2.16 
Security Level (SL)  658.89***  1.81  2.80 
Treasury Bill (TB)  -495.12***  -1.36  -3.25 
Slope (SLOP)  -504.00***  -1.38  -2.57 
Spread (S)  -1798.36***  -4.93  -2.90 
B (N = 299) R
2=0.093       
Industry Code (IC)            16.59  0.05  0.13 
Security Level (SL)  451.11***  1.24  2.84 
Treasury Bill (TB)             -439.81**  -1.20  -1.99 
Slope (SLOP)             -474.20**  -1.30  -2.18 
Spread (S)            279.57  0.77  0.66 
CCC (N = 21) R
2=0.380       
Industry Code (IC)          -370.42  -1.01  -1.21 
Security Level (SL)  889.87***  2.44  2.88 
Treasury Bill (TB)         -263.44  -0.72  -0.46 
Slope (SLOP)         -178.88  -0.49  -0.25 
Spread (S)       -1016.23  -2.78  -0.28 
 
***Significance at the 1% level, **Significance at the 5% level, *Significance at the 10% level 
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Table IX 
Sub Sample Characteristics 
 
This table shows the mean and standard deviation of the independent variables for the 
whole sample period and the two sub periods. 
  January 1, 1995 to 
December 31, 2001 
January 1, 1995 to 
June 30, 1998 
July 1, 1998 to 
December 31, 2001 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Industry Code (IC)  0.15  0.36  0.14  0.35  0.16  0.36 
Security Level (SL)  2.06  0.34  2.06  0.35  2.06  0.34 
Treasury Bill (TB)  4.84  1.14  5.36  0.29  4.63  1.27 
Slope (SLOP)  0.76  0.13  0.62  0.05  0.81  0.12 
Spread (S)  0.88  0.86  1.01  0.48  0.82  0.96 
 
 
                                                
1 To the extent that the bond may also be subject to roll over risk then the short-term bond may be 
coupled with a seniority/security clause.  
2 Also Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980) argue that call features are equally capable of resolving 
agency problems and information asymmetries as issuing short term rather than long-term bonds so 
including bonds with these features would blur the focus of this work. 
3This information was obtained from the Federal Reserve website http: // www. Federalreserve. gov 
4 We examined the data but could not find an economic reason why we have positive first order 
autocorrelation for A, BBB and BB rated bonds.  We think it is a sample phenomenon because later 
when we examine sub-periods we find that the structure of first order autocorrelation is different. For 
the first period, AA through BB show evidence of positive first order autocorrelation, while in the 
second sub-period only BB and CCC rated bonds show evidence of positive first order autocorrelation. 
We decided to correct the regressions for positive autocorrelation as otherwise the t-statistics would be 
inflated. 
5 We also estimated these regressions for all the sub-ratings, for example AA
+, AA and AA
- rather than 
just one regression for the AA broad rating category.  This leads to a problem with split ratings where 
Standard and Poors rate a bond A
+ but Moodys rates the bond A so we ran split rating regressions 
separately. Generally we found that when Standard and Poors and Moodys agree on the credit ratings, 
the results reported in the main text are strongly supported. However for split ratings the coefficients 
were rarely significant and sometimes when the coefficients were significant they had the wrong sign.  
6 We lose five observations because there were only five CCC observations in the first sub period, too 
few for regression estimates, so we dropped these observations. 